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Abstract—Cognitive Autonomous Networks (CAN) [1] are
promoted to advance Self Organizing Network (SON), replacing
rule-based SON Functions (SFs) with Cognitive Functions (CFs),
which learn optimal behavior by interacting with the network.
As in SON, CFs do encounter conflicts due to overlap in pa-
rameters or objectives. However, owing to the non-deterministic
behavior of CFs, these conflicts cannot be resolved using rule-
based methods and new solutions are required. This paper
investigates the CF deployments with and without a coordination
mechanism, and proves both heuristically and mathematically
that a coordination mechanism is required. Using a two-CF
Multi-Agent-System model with the possible types of conflicts, we
show that the challenge is a typical bargaining problem, for which
the optimal response is the Nash bargaining Solution (NBS). We
use NBS to propose a coordination mechanism design that is
capable of resolving the conflicts and show via simulations how
implementation of the proposed solution is feasible in real life
scenario.
Index Terms—Cognitive Autonomous Networks, Conflict Res-
olution, Game Theory, NBS, Prisoner’s Dilemma
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous increase of mobile network users and their on-
line activities have motivated the deployment of several Radio
Access Technologies (RATs) to improve spectral efficiency
and Quality of Service (QoS). To address the increasing op-
erational complexity coming from introduction of new RATs,
network automation exemplified by Self-Organizing Networks
(SON) [2] is applied. SON proposed to deploy several closed-
loop control-based functions, called SON Functions (SFs),
each of which deals with a specific problem like Mobility
Robustness Optimization (MRO), Mobility Load Balancing
(MLB) etc. Based on the network states (e.g., changes in Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs)), an SF determines individual
network configuration parameters following some predefined
rules. Since there are multiple SFs present in a SON, conflicts
of interest may arise among them due to overlap of parameters
or objectives. At the top of these SFs, rule based SON
coordination ensures that the SFs do not conflict with one
another during operations.
SON has two primary disadvantages - i) rule based SFs
have limited capability in adapting themselves in a changing
environment, ii) large number of rules makes maintenance and
upgradation of the system difficult. Cognitive Autonomous
Networks (CAN) [1] overcome the problems of SON and
provides a more flexible system by replacing SFs with CFs.
Unlike SF, CF does not exhibit rule-based behavior, rather it
learns from the environment and acts based on its learning.
As CFs show a non-deterministic behavior, conflicts among
CFs cannot be resolved using existing rule-based methods and
some new approach is necessary. There already exist prior
research works which propose different ways on how the CFs
can coordinate and work in a decentralized manner [3], [4],
but, these works show neither the necessity of collaboration
among the CFs nor the optimality of the solution provided.
In this paper our contributions are three-fold - 1. we
mathematically prove, using Prisoner’s Dilemma from Game
Theory [5], that coordination mechanism among the CFs is
needed for better performance of the system, 2. we design
an easily implementable but effective coordination mechanism
capable of determining the optimal configuration for a certain
state of the network, and, 3. we also model a heterogeneous
Multi Agent System (MAS) in Python that exhibits all types
of conflicts [2] among the CFs and implement our proposed
solution in that model to show the its feasibility in real life.
II. CONFLICT MODEL IN CAN
Network automation functions typically exhibit three types
of conflicts -
• Category A. Configuration conflict which occurs on
either, (A1) Input, or, (A2) Output parameter(s).
• Category B. Measurement conflict where action of one
function influences measurement of output of another.
• Category C. Characteristic conflict which are of two
types - (C1)Direct characteristic conflict and (C2)Logical
dependency conflict.
Lets us assume that there are two CFs, F1 and F2 working
at a Base Station (BS) with objectives o1 and o2 respectively
and without communicating with each other. These are the two
agents of the MAS. There are two inputs to F1 - p1 and p2,
and F1 tries to optimize its output o1. There are two inputs
to F2 - p1 and o1, and F2 tries to optimize its output o2. The
system model is depicted in Fig. 1 and the functions with their
related information are listed in Table I.
Now, we can see that all three types of conflicts, are present
in this model -
• As both F1 and F2 share the same input parameter (p1),
so if they have different levels of interest, it is an input
parameter conflict (A1).
• As actions of F1 affects the measurement of o2, output
of F2 , it is a measurement conflict (B1).
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Fig. 1: System model
Function Inputs Outputs Objective
F1 p1, p2 o1 Optimize o1
F2 p1, o1 o2 Optimize o2
TABLE I: CF Descriptions
• Changing p2 affects o1 which in turn changes o2 hence
it is a logical dependency conflict (C2).
In the next sections we use this model to prove necessity of
coordination mechanism among the CFs and to implement our
proposed optimal solution.
III. NECESSITY OF COORDINATION MECHANISM IN CAN
Let us consider the model described in section II and
formulate it as a normal-form game [6] where F1 and F2 are
the players of the game. When there is a conflict of interest
(A1, B1 or C2) between the players, each player can take one
of these following strategies - either, the player continues to
work on the interest (T ), or, it gives up the interest (G). The
payoffs are defined as follows:
• Both of them choose G: no one changes the interest and
it remains constant. Both the CFs get equal payoff out of
it denoted by r1.
• Both of them choose T : the payoff both of them get
is r2. The benefit of fighting for the interest is worse
than keeping it constant because it may change to worse
outcomes for any of the parties and so, r2 < r1.
• One of them selects T and the other selects G: one who
selects T gets a payoff r3 and the other one gets a payoff
r4 with r3 > r4.
Relation among r1, r2, r3 and r4: It is obvious that payoff
is higher when the CF can adjust the interest than when it
remains constant, i.e., r3 > r1. The payoff for one is also
higher when either the interest is controlled by itself or the
interest remains constant than when it is changed according
to the other’s will, i.e., r2 > r4 and r1 > r4. The payoff for
a CF is higher again when only the CF changes it than when
both of them change it, i.e., r3 > r1. The above observations
can be summarized as:
r3 > r1 > r2 > r4 (1)
As mentioned in [5], two criteria for a problem to qualify
as Prisoner’s Dilemma are:
• regardless of what the other players do, each player
receives a higher payoff for defecting behavior than for
cooperating behavior.
• all agents get lower payoff if all defect than cooperate.
Now, a conflict between CFs can be formulated exactly as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma where the defecting behaviors is choosing
T and cooperative behavior is choosing G, because, from
Eq. 1, we observe that:
• Regardless of what the other CF does, each CF receives
a higher payoff for selecting T than selecting G.
• All CFs receive a lower payoff if all choose T than if all
choose G.
Following the solution of Prisoner’s Dilemma, where best
action for each prisoner is to choose defecting behavior, the
best action for each CF is: selecting T .
On the contrary, if the CFs work with the existence of a
coordinating mechanism, they find that the best possible action
for each CF is - choosing G, because, when both of them
select G, both of them get higher payoff (r1) than the payoff
they get (r2) when they select T . This proves the necessity of
a coordination mechanism in the network.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Let us again consider the model described in section II and
assume that both F1 and F2 try to maximize their objectives
and both o1 and o2 are Gaussian distribution functions given
by the following equations:
o1 = e
− p
2
1
2p22 (2)
o2 = e
− (p1−6)22
o21 (3)
We also assume that default value (value at the initial stage
when BS first becomes operational) of p1 is 4 and p2 is 100.
These functions (o1, o2) and values (p1, p2) are assumed in
such a way so that all types of conflicts are present between
F1 and F2.
A. Proposed solution
To resolve the conflicts between F1 and F2 over the values
of p1 and p2, we propose a bargaining between them and
obtain the solution using Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [7].
NBS can be applied when - i) number of players is two or
more, ii) there is a conflict of interest, and iii) there exists
a solution if if negotiation breaks down, and the solution is
obtained by finding the value for which product of outcome of
the players is maximum. As the number of persons is two and
there is a conflict of interest on agreement, Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) can be applied to obtain the solution in this
scenario [6] and this solution is optimal [7]. The optimal value
of p1 is determined following these steps sequentially:
• Both F1 and F2 generate a set of possible values for p1
based on their learning history.
• For each value of p1 in this set, the product of o1 and o2
is calculated while p2 is kept constant.
• When the product is maximum, the corresponding value
of p1 is the optimal value.
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
parameter p1
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
ou
tp
ut
 o
1
p2 = 50
p2 = 100
p2 = 200
p2 = 300
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Fig. 2: Output variations against input parameters
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Fig. 3: Variation of o1 · o2 against input parameters
After the optimal value of p1 is determined, a set of possible
values for p2 is also generated by F1 based on its learning
history. For each value of p2 in this set, the product of o1 and
o2 is calculated while p1 is kept constant at its optimal value.
When the product is maximum, the corresponding value of p2
is the optimal value. In this way the optimal configuration for
the system can be determined.
In this solution we assume that F1 and F2 can generate
sets of values for p1 and p2 based on their previous learning
history. As an alternate, starting from the default, values of
these parameters can be changed slowly and gradient descent
approach can be used to reach the optimal.
B. Implementation and Observation
We build a framework in Python to implement the proposed
solution in the MAS discussed in section II.
In Fig. 2 variations of o1 and o2 against p1 and p2 have been
plotted. From Fig. 2a we see that for a fixed p2, maximum
value of o1 is obtained when p1 lies in between -10 and 10
and maximum value of o2 is obtained when p1 lies in between
0 and 10. Thus, in our simulation, we vary p1 in between 0
and 10 in steps of 1 (step size can be made smaller for better
accuracy) and plot the variation of o1 ·o2 against p1 in Fig. 3a.
From Fig. 3a we see that o1 · o2 is maximum when p1 is 6,
and so, according to NBS, this is the optimal value of p1 for
both F1 and F2.
Once the optimal value of p1 is determined, it is kept
constant at 6 and p2 is varied to determine its optimal value.
For a fixed p1, when the value of p2 increases, we see from
Fig. 2a that the value of o1 increases whereas from Fig. 2b
we see that the value of o2 remains almost constant. For this
reason, when we plot o1 · o2 against p2 in Fig. 3b we see that
o1·o2 increases with increase in value of p2. As a specific range
for p2 cannot be determined, we vary p2 between 50 and 300
in our simulation and according to NBS, optimal value of p2
in this scenario is 300. However, in real life there is always a
maximum and minimum value for a parameter between which
it can be varied.
V. RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATION
As the CAN with CFs has been formulated as a MAS in
this paper, in this section we discuss relevant existing research
works on MAS ( [13], [21] ) and removal of conflicts (reaching
a consensus) in a MAS ( [17], [22] ).
F1
X X X X X X X X
F2
X X X X X X X X
F3
X X X X X X X X
F4
X X X X X X X X
[8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] X
TABLE II: Existing works on MAS features
In our MAS model, described in section II, each agent, i.e.
CF, has the following features:
F1. each agent can learn and decide what is the best action
for it by itself in a dynamic environment.
F2. no agent can communicate with each other and no one
has a complete knowledge of the system.
F3. some or all of these agents share the same resources and
there exist conflicts of interests among them.
F4. each agent tries to optimize its own target or goal
simultaneously, and the concept of a common or team
goal does not exist.
Based on agent characteristics, we divide existing research
works on MAS into several categories so that a combination of
these features are covered in each category. These categories
are listed in Table II. From Table II we see that there are
a number of prior research articles which encompass one or
some combinations of those four features described above,
but there does not exist any paper which covers all the four
features (as shown in Table II). Ours is the first one which
considers a MAS with all of these four properties.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
In this paper we discuss conflict resolution among cognitive
functions and prove, using Prisoner’s Dilemma, that a coor-
dinating mechanism is needed for better performance of the
system. We provide a solution to resolve the possible types
of conflicts among the CFs. We build a MAS in Python and
show that our proposed solution can be implemented there to
resolve the conflicts and obtain the optimal settings for the
operational purposes. Currently we are building prototypes of
these cognitive functions and as a next step we want to test
them in a simulation environment to do a comparative study
among possible coordination mechanisms.
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